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Abstract:
Various so-called green investments are intended to limit the warming of the 
earth's climate, thus minimizing social, environmental and economic damage. The 
article introduces into the corresponding research field of Green Finance by 
providing current data, by showing historical developments, and by forecasting 
future tasks. Further, the article depicts the major difficulties of research on Green 
Finance; particularly rapid technological progress, the dependence of 
governmental support, high uncertainties, and, especially the interactions of so 
many actors. Finally, the article gives a short review on the research field of 
Green Finance. 
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1. Introduction
Up to today, no commonly accepted definition of the term “Green Finance” exists
(see Lindenberg, 2014). Instead, its meaning is varying significantly between 
various publications. Following Eyraud et al. (2011) we will understand Green 
Finance as a broad term that “refers to the investment necessary to reduce 
greenhouse gas and air pollutant emissions, without significantly reducing the 
production and consumption of non-energy goods”. According to the Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 2007), without action, the 
climate change can result in a monetary-loss of more than 5% of worldwide GDP. 
Additionally, the climate change is expected to lead to terrible non-monetary 
effects like a high death toll, the need of migration, the loss of habitat or the 
extinction of species. However, by a crucial reduction of the world wide carbon 
emissions these catastrophic consequences can still be prevented. Here, green 
investments are vital as they reduce carbon emissions (i) by providing low-
emission energy supply, (ii) by increasing energy-efficiency, and (iii) by 
sequestration of carbon (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Overview on green investments (based on Eyraud et al., 2011)
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Figure 2: Development of worldwide renewable energy investments between 2004 and 2015 in 
billions of US-Dollars (Sources: UNEP; Bloomberg New Energy Finance, statista.de).
The total amount of worldwide green investments can hardly be estimated. 
Especially, energy efficiency investments usually are not particularly counted and 
are often difficult to distinguish from replacements. For example, did a certain 
company buy a new machine because the old machine was broken and had to be 
replaced? Or because technological change required a new machine? Or because it 
just wanted to increase its production capacity? Or because the new machine is 
more energy-efficient and safes energy costs? Only in the latter case, buying the 
machine is undoubtedly an energy-efficiency investment. In reality, usually a 
mixture of the four different motivations induces the investment.
Though, the total amount of energy-efficiency investments cannot exactly be 
measured; only some estimations or predictions on the amount of worldwide 
energy-efficiency spending exist. For example, it has been estimated that in 2013 
worldwide 825 billion US-$ have been spent for clear energy-efficiency 
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investments. Consequently, almost surely, energy-efficiency investments have the 
highest market volume of all Green Investments.
However, in case of renewable energy investments sufficiently reliable data exists 
to measure the worldwide investment activity. In particular, between 2004 and 
2015 the annual worldwide renewable energy investments have increased from 
46.6 billion US-$ to 285.9 billion US-$ (see Figure 2). For comparison, in the 
same time only 20 billion US-$ have been invested in carbon sequestration 
projects. 1 Consequently, we will in the following focus on renewable energy 
investments. With the exemption of the years 2009, 2012 and 2013 an increase in 
the annual renewable energy investments can be observed in any year. In total, 
more than 2.3 trillion US-$ have been invested in renewable energy projects 
during the last 12 years. As a consequence the production of renewable energy has 
increased from 1,037 Gigawatt in 2006 to 1,935 Gigawatt in 2015.2 Though, the 
worldwide share of renewable energy on the total produced primary energy has 
only increased slowly since 2006. In 2006 renewables had a share of 12.4% on 
total primary energy production. 2015 this share has been 13.5%.3
Figure 3: Share of different renewable energy sources on the worldwide total production of 
primary renewable energy in 2013 (Sources, IEA, statista.de).
                                                          
1 International Energy Agency (2015), Tracking Clean Energy Progress 2015, OECD/IEA, Paris
2 Statista.de, retrieved July 11th, 2016 
3 Statista.de, retrieved July 11th, 2016 
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A clear majority of the worldwide renewable energy is produced from bio mass 
(73%); mostly fire wood and bio-fuels, but it also includes electricity from 
burning waste or energy crops (see Figure 3). Another larger proportion comes 
from hydro power sources (18%). Wind energy, solar energy, geothermal energy, 
and tidal energy count for only 10% of the world’s renewable energy production.
Interestingly, with regard to renewable energy investments wind power and solar 
power are dominating. In particular, from the 285.9 billion US-$ that have been 
spent into renewable energy in 2015, 161 billion US-$ (56.3%) have been 
invested into solar energy and 109.6 billion US-$ (38.3%) have been invested into 
wind energy.4 Furthermore, in 2015, 81 billion US-$ (28.3% of the worldwide 
renewable energy investments) have been invested in China, followed by the 
United States with 36.3 billion US-$ (12.7%), Japan with 34.3 billion US-$
(12%), the United Kingdom with 13.9 billion US-$ (4.9%), and Germany with 
11.4 billion US-$ (4.5%) (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Most important countries in the world according to their level of investments in 
renewable energy in 2015 in billions of US dollars (Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance).
                                                          
4 UNEP, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, statista.de, retrieved July 11thg, 2016 
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Thus, undoubtedly, Green Investments have an impressive volume and investors, 
manufacturers and governments should be interested in their dynamic 
development. However, it is not the market size that justifies a separate 
consideration to other investment opportunities. Instead, green investments show 
unique characteristics that differ from common investments. 
The most important of these differences are big importance of externalities, 
dependence on governmental support, rapid technological progress and multiple 
sources of uncertainty. They will be discussed in detail in chapter 2. In Section 3 
the view of five key-actors with respect to the diffusion of green technologies is 
explained; particularly investors, manufacturers, infrastructure operators,
governments, and researchers. Furthermore, the interdependencies of these actors 
and influences from additional actors are shown. Section 4 gives a short review on 
research in the field of Green Finance. Finally, Section 5 concludes and gives 
perspectives for future research.
2. Characteristics of Green Investments
Green investments differ from common “non-green” investments by four special 
characteristics; they cause externalities, their profitability depends on 
governmental support, they occur in an environment of rapid technological 
progress and they are subject to severe uncertainties. Obviously, not every green 
investment project necessarily has to cope with every of these four characteristics. 
Likewise, also non-green investments may cause externalities, may depend on 
governmental support, may occur in an environment of rapid technological 
progress, or their profitability is uncertain. 
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2.1 Externalities of Green Investments
Green investments create a multitude of externalities. First of all, they help to 
prevent the climate change and its consequences. But green investments can also 
have strategic benefits. Increasing energy efficiency and the production of 
renewable electricity both reduce the dependence of a country from oil or gas 
exporting countries (Tänzler et al., 2007). Simultaneously, the trade balance of the 
respective countries is improved - at least as long as a substantial part of the value 
added is created domestically. From an economic viewpoint, all kinds of green 
investments create jobs, resulting in a higher GDP as well as higher taxes and 
social security contributions. For example, only the production of renewable 
electricity is assumed to have created 370.000 jobs in Germany (O’Sullivan et al., 
2015). On a worldwide basis it is even estimated that green investments create 
fifteen to sixty million jobs (Poschen and Tobin, 2012). Furthermore, 
technological progress is enhanced by green investments, improving the market 
opportunities of the country’s industry on the world market.
However, green investments also cause negative externalities. Increasing energy 
efficiency by thermal insulation can increase the risk of fire and in a case of fire 
result in toxic vapors. 5 According to Schuiling (2014) carbon capturing and 
sequestration is not safe and not sustainable. On one hand the process of capturing 
and storing carbon needs a substantial amount of energy and thus produces extra 
carbon. On the other hand a high risk exists that a carbon leakage might harm the 
health of people nearby or the surrounding environment. Furthermore, a carbon 
                                                          
5 Spiegel Online, November 5th, 2014: „Behörden-Tests: Dämmung an Millionen Häusern kann 
Brände anfachen“. 
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leakage revokes the benefits of the carbon capturing. Regarding renewable energy 
it is often argued that the production of bio-fuel competes with the production of 
food and thus starves the poorest (Ford Runge and Senauer, 2007). Furthermore, it 
is argued that for the production of bio-fuels often valuable natural areas, for 
example tropical rain forests, have to be destroyed (Fitzherbert et al., 2008). With 
regard to renewable electricity, the construction of dams for hydro power certainly 
has a weighty impact on nature and landscape. Likewise, wind power is blamed 
for noise, disturbing shadows, the death of bats and birds as well as for negative 
landscape externalities (Meyerhoff et al., 2010). Finally, the massive production 
of renewable electricity provides great challenges to utilities and network 
operators. Due to the volatile electricity production, especially in case of wind 
power and photovoltaic, the requirements for the net infrastructure and very 
flexible conventional power plants increase. For this reason, a considerable 
investment effort is required to ensure permanent supply. In Germany, according 
to the Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft, investments of more 
than fifty billion Euro will be needed for the net infrastructure until 2032.6
However, in many cases the most important deficiency of green investments is 
that they are not profitable to investor’s on a stand-alone basis. For example, in 
the case of renewable electricity, the levelized costs of electricity determine 
whether a certain electricity source is competitive to the market. For each 
electricity source this levelized costs of electricity can be determined by dividing 
the sum of costs over life-time of the electricity producing system by the sum of 
electricity produced over the life-time of the electricity producing system. As can 
be seen in Figure 5, in Germany as well as in the US, renewable electricity from 
                                                          
6 Der Tagesspiegel: “Die Angst vor dem Staat”. 8.6.2016 
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offshore wind power, photovoltaic, and bio mass is not yet competitive to 
conventional electricity sources like coal, natural gas or IGCC or lignite. Onshore 
wind power, thus, is the only renewable electricity source that has already reached 
competitiveness. According to Allcott and Greenstone (2012) most professionals 
in the energy industry have long believed in an enormous “win-win” opportunity 
of energy efficiency projects, i.e. saving money and reducing the energy use at the 
same time. However, due to imperfect information companies and households 
often do not undertake energy efficiency investments, which would profitable to 
them. Thus, the energy efficiency gap is created, “a wedge between the cost-
minimizing level of energy efficiency and the level actually realized”. Finally, 
carbon sequestration does not create any surplus on a standalone basis.
2.2 Governmental Support of Green Investments
Usually, the positive externalities of green investments are seen to far outweigh 
the negative externalities. Thus, in the cases, where green investments are not 
profitable on a standalone basis, governmental support is needed to generate these 
investments. The different possibilities of promoting green investments can be 
categorized in subsidies, regulation, pricing, or quotas and caps (see Figure 6).
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Figure 5: Levelized costs of electricity for different electricity sources. Index value, based on the 
electricity costs from coal in the respective study. Blue: costs in Germany 2013, determined by the 
Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems (Kost et al., 2013); red: costs in the United States 
2015, determined by the U.S. Energy Information Administration in 2015; green: costs in the 
United States 2020, estimated in by the U.S. Energy Information Administration in 2015.7
Fiscal instruments, e.g. subsidies or tax incentives, use government funds to 
increase the profitability of green investments by decreasing investment costs 
and/or increasing profits. They are easy to understand and implement, however, 
they are not necessarily cost effective and it is not guaranteed that a certain target 
is met (Gan et al., 2007). An example are tax deductions and credits of the US 
government for producers of renewable electricity (Gan et al., 2007). Another 
example are subsidies on the investment costs and subsidized financing of energy 
efficiency investments, e.g. thermal insulation by the German government 
(Galvin, 2010).
                                                          
7 U.S. Energy Information Administration: “Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New 
Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2015” 
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Figure 6: The four fundamental ways of governmental support of green investments
By using regulation to promote green investments, governments assure by law
that investors do not have another choice but to invest in projects with a minimum 
“greenness”. By regulation a government can be sure to meet a certain target. 
However, regulations are usually not cost-effective. Examples are the German 
“Energieeinsparverordnung für Gebäude” that establishes a maximal heat energy 
consumption per unit floor area for new constructed buildings (Galvin, 2010) or 
the European Union’s mandatory emissions target for new cars of 130g/km that 
will be reduced to 95g/km in 2021.8 Furthermore, many countries have endorsed 
mandatory blending targets of bio-fuels. For example, in Canada gasoline has to 
contain at least 5% bio-fuels, the same holds for Argentina and several Indian 
states. Beginning in 2020 even a ten percent bio-fuel share is mandatory in the 
European Union (Sorda et al., 2010).
                                                          
8 International Council on Clean Transportation: „EU CO2 emission standards for passenger  
cars and light-commercial vehicles”, 2014. 
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By using quotas and caps to support green investments a government relies on 
market mechanism for resource utilization and technology choice (Gan et al., 
2007). Here, a government defines a certain quota (minimal share) or a cap 
(maximal amount) every company within a certain industry or several industries 
as a whole have to achieve. Companies that do not perform according to the quota 
or cap have to buy certificates. Companies that perform better than the quota or 
the cap gain certificates, they can sell. Obviously, by using quotas and caps a 
government can achieve any target with security. However, transaction costs of 
quotas and caps are high. Furthermore, quotas and caps do not support high cost 
technologies that due to learning effects might become profitable in the future 
(Gan et al., 2007). An example of a cap system is the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme for carbon, where the European Union establishes a certain cap 
for the combined carbon emission of several European industries. For each ton of 
carbon a company of any of these industries emits, it has to hand over a carbon 
certificate. An example for a quota is the renewable portfolio standard in the state 
of New York which in 2015 mandates utility companies to feed at least 29% 
renewables into the grid. 9 The quota can either fulfilled by the utility company 
themselves or buy the acquisition of renewable certificates.
Pricing is mostly used in the case of supporting renewable electricity. Here, the 
government implements a system that allows producers of renewable electricity to 
gain a higher price per kWh than the market price. Today, three different 
mechanisms are used to support renewable electricity. First, some governments 
have established feed-in tariffs. Here, producers of renewable electricity have the 
guarantee to get a fix payment per kWh electricity produced. Feed-in tariffs are 
                                                          
9 DESIRE, North Carolina State University (www.desire.org, retrieved July15th, 2016). 
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the most frequently used way of supporting renewable electricity and are used in 
65 countries and 27 US-states.10 Feed-in tariffs provide a save return to investors 
and can also be implemented via competitive tendering. Furthermore, they easily 
allow to support different technologies or different investment with different 
tariffs. However, usually they are not cost-effective and do not ensure to achieve a 
long-term target (Gan et al., 2007). Second, some governments have established a 
price-premium support scheme. In a price premium support scheme the 
government pays producers of renewable electricity a markup on the market price 
of renewable electricity, either fixed or as a percentage of the market price. In the 
European Union many original fixed feed-in tariff support systems are at least 
partly transformed to price-premium support schemes in recent years (Grau, 
2014). Price-premium support schemes are more market-based than fixed feed-in 
tariffs and thus encourage competition between technology generations. Though, 
they imply a bigger risk to investors (Couture et al., 2010). Third, some 
governments have implemented net metering. Here, producers of renewable 
electricity get the chance to virtually use their produced renewable electricity at 
any time, thus profiting from the difference of the subscription price and the 
market price of electricity. For example, net metering is implemented in 44 US-
sates, Guam and Puerto Rico.11 Obviously net metering is only appropriate to 
support small private renewable electricity investments. 
Technological progress, economic developments or changes in the green 
awareness of society sometimes make governments to adjust the support system 
for certain green investments. For example, in Germany feed-in tariffs for solar 
                                                          
10 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st century: “Renewables 2012. Global Status 
Report”, 2012. 
11 DESIRE, North Carolina State University (www.desire.org, retrieved July15th, 2016). 
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electricity are regularly customized to the investment activity in recent periods.12
Sometimes governments also decide to implement a change in the method of 
governmental support. For example, the UK has replaced its system of 
competitive tendering for feed-in tariffs by a quota system (Boomsma et al., 
2012). However, the investment activity may be very sensitive to changes in 
governmental support. In particular, a fundamental reduction in the amount of 
governmental support or a sudden change in the support system can lead to a total 
collapse of the investment activity regarding a certain green investment (Haas et 
al., 2004; Munksgaard and Morthorst, 2008).
2.3 Technological Progress
The overall aim of governmental support of renewables is to initiate a process that 
brings down the respective costs to a level where these technologies can actually 
compete with conventional technologies (	

). And indeed, 
after massive governmental support, a strong increase in profitability could have 
been achieved for various green investments during the last decades. For the 
future a further increase in profitability is expected. 
For example, the levelized cost of electricity from wind power has decreased from 
more than 500 dollar per MWh in the 1970s to less than 50 dollar per MWh in 
present days. A decisive influence had the technological progress. New design 
architectures and advanced materials let wind power generating systems get 
bigger and more powerful. In particular, the height of hubs has increased from 
17m in the 1980s to 100m in current days. This allows to access stronger and less 
                                                          
12 www.bundesnetzagentur.de, retrieved July 6th, 2016. 
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turbulent winds at higher altitude (Lantz et al., 2012). This trend is expected to 
continue in the future (see Figure 7).
According to Pillai (2015) a large share in the cost reduction, furthermore, is 
generated upstream in the supply chain due to learning curve effects. For example,
in the case of photovoltaic a price drop in the raw material polysilicon has been 
caused by increasing plant sizes. Furthermore, solar panels manufacturing prices 
have been significantly dropped due to the appearance of Chinese manufacturers. 
Since 1990 the module costs have been decreased from 10 US-$ per Watt to 0.6 
US-$ per Watt. This development follows the so called Swanson-Law, i.e. the 
module price for photovoltaic drops by 20% for every doubling of cumulative 
shipped outcome (see Figure 8).
As a result the levelized costs of electricity for photovoltaic in Germany have
decreased by more than 70% since 2000. Following recent estimations, the 
levelized cost of electricity for photovoltaic may decrease by further 59% until 
2025 (Taylor et al., 2016). 
Figure 7: Development of levelized cost of energy for wind power (left) and height of wind power 
hubs (right). Source: US Department of Energy, DuVivier (2016).
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Figure 7: Solar panel module costs per Watt in dependence of cumulative module shipments. 
Source: wikipedia.de (data from ITRPV Edition 2015). 
In case of carbon capture and storage such estimations are difficult to make as 
projections of the deployment of CCS technologies vary considerably (Koelbl et 
al., 2014).
2.4 Uncertainties
Green investments are subject to the same uncertainties than ordinary 
investments. In particular, these are economic uncertainties, political uncertainties 
and technological uncertainties. However, in case of green investments the extent 
of these uncertainties as well as their effect usually is much greater. 
Regarding economic uncertainty almost all investment projects face uncertainty 
on wages as well as on other factor prices, uncertainty regarding the (riskless) 
interest rate and uncertainty about the demand and market price of the produced 
goods. If we look at the “goods” produced by green investments we observe that 
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many of them are not storable. Unless regulated by statutory rules the price of 
renewable electricity is continuously determined on the market balancing 
stochastic demand and supply. Likewise, energy-savings that result from green 
investments are compensated by the saved market price of electricity. As can be 
seen in Figure 8 the market price of electricity is extremely volatile. Within one 
year day-ahead prices may vary between zero and more than 2000 Euro per MWh. 
Obviously, intra-day prices are even more volatile. Furthermore, prices may even 
become negative. Likewise, the market price of bio-fuels or of saved conventional 
fuel also is very volatile, although not nearly as extreme as the market price of 
electricity.
Consequently, investors in green projects face a high economic uncertainty and 
can hardly estimate future earnings. This problem is further intensified by the fact 
that the earnings of most green investments are strongly influenced by political 
decisions and hence are subject to a great degree of political uncertainty.
Figure 8: History of price extremes in the German day-ahead market of electricity. Blue: 
maximum day-ahead price; red: minimum day-ahead price. Source: Fraunhofer ISE, EEX. 
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Figure 9: Development of the carbon emission allowances price in Euro per ton CO2 between 
2003 and 2008. Dark blue curve: price between 2003 and 2005; magenta curve: price 2006; orange 
curve: price 2007; violet curve: price 2008; light blue curve: 2008 future; brown curve 2009 
future. Source: Nicole Dellero, AREVA.
For example, the profit of carbon capture and storage depends on two basically 
political decisions. First, the decision that carbon emissions have to be reduced 
and, second, the decision about the actual amount of carbon that may be emitted 
during a certain time span. Especially elections and international summits can 
result in a major political shift (Kelly et al., 2016), constituting a major risk for the 
profitability of green investments and carbon capture projects in particular. Figure 
9 depicts how much the price of carbon allowances depend on this political 
decisions. In particular, in the first phase emission allowances were valid until the 
end of 2007. When it turned out that the quantity of carbon emissions in phase 1 
set by the European governments did not exceed the demand for carbon emissions 
the allowance price fell to zero. However, at the same time allowances of the 
second phase with validity from 2008 to 2012 had a positive value that could 
already be observed on the exchange in form of a futures contract.
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3. The different actors and their interactions
Green investments take place in an environment characterized by the decisions
and interactions of various actors. Particularly, of highest importance are 
investors, manufacturers, infrastructure operators, governments and researchers 
(see Figure 10). These main actors all pursue individual goals but are caught in a
network of interdependent dependencies. In particular, most decisions of these 
actors have consequences not only for the own achievement of goals but also for 
the other actor’s possibility to achieve their goals. Sometimes these goals are in 
harmony. But sometimes they are also mutually contradictory. Additionally, the 
actors are influenced by further parties (see Figure 10). In the following the roles 
of the five main actors in the field of green investments will be discussed in detail. 
Figure 10: The five most important actors in the environment of green investments and their 
major influencing groups. 
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3.1 Investors
According to neo-classical assumptions investors should be rational (homo 
economicus) and solely aim to maximize their wealth. Hence, they should only 
select investments according to the risk / return profile. Recently, however, it has 
been shown that most investors - including institutional ones - pursue further 
goals including sustainability, whereby the weight on sustainability and the 
definition of sustainability differs between the investors (Winnett and Lewis, 
2000, Lewis, 2001). Thus, if (and when) an investor invests into a green project is 
partly determined by his individual characteristics.
Obviously, to a great degree the willingness of an investor to invest into a project 
also depends on the profitability of the project and the associated risk. Both profit 
and risk are decisively influenced by the actions of other actors. For example, the 
profitability of carbon capture and storage strongly depends on the future price of 
carbon emissions allowances (
  
 ). These prices, 
however, are based on political decisions, i.e. the total amount of carbon emission 
allowances issued, as well as on uncertain economic developments, i.e. the 
demand of carbon emission allowances. Here technological advantage provided 
by researchers and its possible implementation by competitors on the same market 
or of companies at any other market under the same emissions trading scheme 
plays a major role.
Additionally, investors face the problem, when to invest into a green project. For 
example, in the case of photovoltaic investments by waiting with the investment 
the investor can expect to minimize the investment cost. On one hand this may be 
a result of the hard competition of manufacturers and the expansion of production 
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facilities (economics of scale). On the other hand technological progress done by 
researchers may make available more efficient technologies. However, by waiting 
with the investment the investor is exposed to the risk that the government will 
change the conditions of governmental support for renewables for the bad or that
infrastructure operators - net operators in particular - will worsen their terms. 
Furthermore, the green investment may depend on the willingness of supply chain 
partners to engage in a green project. For example, in the case of carbon capture 
and storage the operator of a coal fired power plant may depend on the 
cooperation of the operator of an abandoned underground mine, who has to 
prepare the mine before the storage of carbon can start. Sometimes even the 
cooperation with competitors is necessary to facilitate a green project. For 
example, the operators of coal fired power plants who are close to each other may 
jointly build a pipeline for the removal of captured carbon. 
Likewise, the profitability of a green investment depends on the acceptance of 
customers or their willingness to pay higher prices after the green investment. For 
example, in the case of investments in energy-efficiency of commercial property 
Miller et al. (2008) have shown that certified sustainable real estate pays off due 
to higher occupancy rates compared to conventional real estate and due to 
customers who are only willing to pay less for conventional real estate. Finally, 
investors depend on the willingness of creditors to finance their green investment 
projects. Here, the government again can have an important influence, either by 
state owned banks or by subsidizing loans for green investments. Furthermore, 
credit risks to a large extant depend on political risks that can be minimized by the 
government with the help of grandfathering rules.
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3.2 Manufacturers
Manufacturers have an important role in the environment of green investments.
Due to economies of scale, i.e. an increasing output, the factory’s unit cost can be 
lowered which allows lower sales prices and hence a higher profitability of green 
investments. After a certain progress on the learning curve driven by researchers 
the different manufacturers usually compete on prices - with only few exemptions 
that provide special solutions for niche markets.
For example, manufacturers of photovoltaic cells may offer different 
technological solutions to turning sunlight into electricity, however, their 
customers, i.e. the investors, have no reason to care about the technology if the 
system generates the promised amount of electricity (Platzer, 2012). For this 
reason in 2011 and 2012 several German photovoltaic manufacturers had to give 
up after the market entry of Chinese manufacturers which lead to overcapacities 
and strongly declining module prices (Bohl et al., 2013). Notably, the price 
advantage of Chinese manufacturers has not been driven by country specific 
advantages like lower wages and taxes but it results from much larger scaling and 
more efficient supply chains (Goodrich et al., 2013). 
Hence, it is the main task of manufacturers to increase their efficiency, for 
example due to capacity expansions, due to improving the collaboration in their 
supply chain or due to technology adoption. However, the profitability of 
manufacturers also strongly depends on the demand which is determined by the 
investment activity of investors in the first instant but also by political decisions 
and regulation as well as by technological developments of researchers. Thus, to 
assure profitability, it pays to observe and maybe to influence these other actors. 
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3.3 Infrastructure Operators
Due to green investments infrastructure operators are facing great difficulties and 
risks but somehow also new opportunities. For example, with the “Erneuerbare 
Energien Gesetz (EEG)” of 1991 the German government has made net operators 
to receive any renewable electricity at any time or otherwise to pay compensation 
to the producers of renewable electricity. Exemptions can only be made if a grid 
connection is not necessary or not economically feasible (Hoppmann et al., 2014). 
The production of renewable energy, however, has a large space requirement and 
is dependent on wind and sun. While rural regions can become large electricity 
producers, the urbanized areas cannot meet their own needs. The resulting 
division of energy production and energy consumption requires an expansion of 
the electricity grid which is capable of this transfer task.13 On one hand this means 
enormous expenditures for net operators on the other hand they may earn high net 
charges in the future. 
From a decision-making point of view infrastructure operators usually have only a 
reacting role. Decisions are made by the governments and in a second stage by the 
investors, for example the owners of a wind park. The grid operator then has to 
act under the given conditions, i.e. he has to maximize its profits under the 
constraint of guaranteeing grid stability. However, the other actors - especially the 
governments - should already take into account the skills and problems of 
infrastructure operators in their own decision-making. For example, problems 
with the grid expansion can jeopardize the government's objectives. Or even 
worse, a severe power failure can result in catastrophic problems. 
                                                          
13 www.herausforderung-netzausbau.de (retrieved January 4th 2017) 
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3.4 Governments
It is well known that governments and administrations from time to time act for 
their own benefit. They give their re-election higher priority than the interests of 
the country or may even be corrupt (Biglaiser and Mezzetti, 1997; Mauro, 1998;
Caselli and Morelli, 2004). Furthermore, they are - also in the case of green 
technologies - continuously influenced by several lobbying groups (Sühlsen and 
Hisschemöller, 2014). However, even if we assume that governments only act in
best interest for the country, they still have to pursue countless goals. In particular, 
governments have to care about inner security, the military, the economy, social 
security, education and science, the environment, infrastructure, health care, etc. 
Consequently, governmental action must always keep an eye on all of these 
objectives while the weight given to these objectives is represented by the 
constantly changing social attitudes.
Hence, also governmental programs regarding green technologies are evaluated 
from different angles; for example the support of renewable electricity production 
or incentives to increase the energy-efficiency of households (Akella et al., 2009).
In addition to the obvious criteria “ecological benefit”, “electricity prices” and 
“cost for tax payers” governments take into account the impact of these programs 
on employment (O’Sullivan et al., 2015), their impact on foreign and security 
policy (Tänzler et al., 2007), and the degree of social acceptance (Wüstenhagen et 
al., 2007). Consequently, governmental decisions regarding the support of green 
technologies have to be regarded as a multi-criteria decision problem (Konidari 
and Mavrakis, 2007; Blechinger and Shah, 2011). Moreover, the outcome of the 
decision depends on the actions of several players and on multiple uncertainties.
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Therefore, when designing an optimal policy governments have to take the 
uncertainties as well as the possible reactions of the other parties into account. In 
particular, it is important to determine the reaction function of investors, i.e. to 
which extant will investors invest given a certain support policy. For example, this 
can be done with the help of investment planning models (Neuhoff et al., 2008). 
To stimulate green investments governments can also promote the technological 
progress, i.e. to fund researchers and manufacturers, and maintain the stability of 
markets (Zhang et al., 2016). Additionally, governments must also take into 
account the situation of the infrastructure operators in their policy decisions. Here, 
the “Not in my backyard-problem” has to be solved. In particular, people and 
local politicians appose infrastructure projects like grid expansions that may harm 
them but are necessary on a nationwide basis (Dear, 1992; van der Horst, 2007).
Finally, governments are typically not totally free in their policy design with 
respect to green technologies, but they are bounded by several contracts and 
treaties with foreign countries. For example, in the 2015 Paris Agreement 195 
countries committed themselves to achieve certain individual emission targets 
(Rogelj et al., 2016). Member states of the European Union furthermore are bound 
to several European environmental regulations including the European Union 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the Effort-Sharing Decision (EDS).14
Thus, from a modeling perspective international treaties act as constraints in the 
government’s multi-criteria optimization problem. However, it can also be argued 
that since countries are sovereign, they can terminate international contracts at any 
time, a fear that with respect to the United States arose after the election of 
Donald Trump (Elkerbout, 2016).
                                                          
14 www.bmub.bund.de/P3634/ retrieved January 4th 2017 
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3.5 Researchers
Researchers accompany the development of green technologies from the 
beginning, i.e. from basic research, over phases of initial technology application 
until the improving and re-thinking of current standard technologies. For example, 
Becquerel (1839) discovered the underlying physical effects of photovoltaic cells.
In the 1950s scientists from the field of space travel developed the first 
application of photovoltaic cells in context of the American space program. Until 
today research is done to further improve the efficiency of photovoltaic cells. 
Since 1975 the maximum efficiency thus has been increased from 22% to 46%.15
Of course, research is depending on funding. By funding of certain researchers 
actors can thus have a great influence on the speed of technological progress in a 
certain area and hence on the speed of its diffusion. Typically, the largest part of 
funding for the development of green technologies comes from governments and 
state-owned organizations. In this regard, Azadi et al. (2016) could show that in 
case of bio-fuels research expenditures of governments and scientific output have 
been highly correlated. Substantial funding for the research in green technologies 
is also provided by manufacturers, infrastructure and lobbyism organizations. 
However, for researchers the acceptance of external funding - which often is 
required or at least honored by their research institutions - can result in a dilemma. 
Research, which is considered more useful to society or science, may have to be 
given lower priority just to serve the particular interests of individual donors. 
Even worse, the dependence of external funding may in certain cases lead to 
biased studies or even faked results (Nürnberger, 2005).
                                                          
15 National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
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4. Green Finance: A short literature review
Obviously, the interaction of various uncertainties and game-theoretic 
dependencies in the research field can hardly be comprehensively modeled or 
analyzed. Thus, research in the field of Green Finance research usually focus on a
certain aspects or otherwise has to use drastic simplifications.
At first, a research strand discusses the advantages and disadvantages of certain 
green technologies - mostly in the field of renewable energy (see e.g. Klessmann 
et al., 2008; Akella et al., 2009; Burgos-Payán et al., 2013). Some researchers also 
just discuss certain disadvantages, for example landscape externalities caused by 
wind power projects (Meyerhoff et al., 2010), or in case of bio-diesel production 
environmental damages at palm oil plantations (Fitzherbert et al., 2008), and the 
competition to food production (Ford Runge and Senauer, 2007).
Another research strand discusses if certain green technologies are efficient from 
an investor’s perspective. In particular, it is analyzed if the technologies break 
even. For example, Kopp et al. (2012) analyze the situation for diverse renewable 
electricity technologies, Harder and Gibson (2011) and Hagerman et al. (2016)
consider the profitability solar electricity and Benitez et al. (2008) investigate the 
economics of the combination of wind power production with energy storage. In 
case of energy-efficiency technologies Berry and Davidson (2015) test the 
profitability of zero-energy homes and Miller et al. (2008) study empirically if 
energy-efficiency investments in commercial real estate pays off. Finally, 

and Reichelstein (2011) examine the break-even value of carbon capture and 
storage technologies for newly built conventional power plants.
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Related research deals with the selection of the most suitable technology, for 
example, between alternative energy technologies (Siddiqui and Fleten, 2010), 
between renewable energy production and carbon capture and storage (Rohlfs and 
Madlener, 2013), between hybrid or electric vehicles (Nishihara, 2010), within the 
field of photovoltaic cells (García-Cascales et al., 2012) or within the field of bio-
fuels (Tao and Aden, 2009).
However, to determine from an investor’s perspective whether an investment in a 
green technology pays off and which technology is the most promising, it is 
necessary to estimate the respective cost and earnings. In case of renewable 
electricity investments, in case of investments in carbon capture and storage as 
well as in case of investments in the production of bio-fuels, the earnings depend 
on commodity prices that are traded on an exchange and that evolve stochastically 
over time. Consequently, a research strand exists that deals with the stochastic 
modulation of carbon emission allowance prices and its derivatives (see e.g.
Abadie and Chamorro, 2008; Cetin and Verschuere, 2009; Daskalakis et al., 2009;
Jaehn and Letmathe, 2010; Dannenberg and Ehrenfeld, 2011; Chevallier and Sévi,
2013). Likewise, research is done on the stochastic behavior of electricity prices 
(see e.g. Fleten and Kristoffersen, 2007; Gil Zapata and Maya Ochoa, 2008;
Kovacevic and Paraschiv, 2014) and of the price of alternative fuels (Bastian-
Pinto et al., 2009).
On the meta-level, another research strand examines the process of the diffusion 
of green technologies, especially renewable energy technologies (see e.g. 
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004; Madlener et al., 2005; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006;
	

, 2008). Of great importance for the diffusion of technologies is 
the speed of progress on the learning curve, i.e. how fast do the technologies cost 
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decline over time. Several studies deal with the forecast of future cost of future 
technology and determine the causes for the progress on the learning curve. 
Examples are Pillai (2015) in case of photovoltaic and Lantz et al. (2012) in case 
of wind power technology. It is also of particular interest how progress on the 
learning curve can be specifically promoted (see e.g. Foxon et al., 2005; Kosugi,
2013; Azadi et al., 2016). However, it is also seen that the speed and the result of 
technological progress are uncertain. For example, Koelbl et al. (2014) analyze 
the technological uncertainties regarding the development and diffusion of carbon 
capture and storage technologies. As a consequence of technological uncertainty 
Fuss and Szolgayová (2010) argue that investors should not just use a break-even 
analysis to evaluate investment decisions but to use a decision rule that takes 
technological uncertainty into account. As a result any uncertainty associated with 
the technological progress of renewable energy technologies should lead to a 
postponement of investment. In this regard Meijer et al. (2007) could empirically 
show that technological uncertainty actually delays investments in renewable 
energies. Only recently, Torani et al. (2016) argue that it is not just technological 
uncertainty but also an expected fast progress on the learning curve in the near 
future that should let potential investors wait with their investments.
Not only with respect to green investments but in most cases of investments under 
uncertainty real options have been proven to be a valuable tool to analyze 
investment decisions under uncertainty and to especially account for the flexibility 
of the investor to wait with an investment - either until uncertainty has at least 
partially resolved or until expected cost reductions have been achieved. A good 
introduction to the concept of real options and their implementation is given by 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1999).
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With respect to Green Finance already a pronounced research strand exists that 
analyzes the investors’ decision regarding green investments from a real option 
perspective. However, so far, usually not technological uncertainties but market 
price uncertainties are considered. In particular, Cortazar et al. (1998) use the real 
option approach to deal with green investment decisions in general. Likewise, 
Sarkis and Tamarkin (2008) use real options to analyze all kind of investments in
renewable energy projects. More specialized, the real option approach is used in 
case of bio-fuels (Pederson and Zou, 2009), wind power (Fleten et al., 2007;
Muñoz et al., 2011), hydro power (Chaton and Doucet, 2003; Bøckman et al.,
2008; Martínez-Ceseña and Mutale, 2011), geothermal energy (Moreira et al.,
2004), biomass (Di Corato and Moretto, 2011), solar power (Zhang et al., 2016;
Welling, 2016a), energy efficiency (Abadie et al., 2010) as well as the reduction 
of carbon and other emissions (Kort, 1995; Insley, 2003; Abadie and Chamorro,
2008).
However, research on Green Finance does not only consider the investment 
decision but also considers the financing aspects of green investments, i.e. the 
source of financial resources. For example, Criscuolo and Menon (2015) analyze 
the determinants of venture capital with respect to green investments, Tang et al. 
(2012) show how carbon revenue bonds can help to finance green investments and 
Bohl et al. (2013) investigate the performance of renewable energy stocks.
Interestingly, Chava (2014), could show that green investments have an influence 
on the capital structure of companies, particularly increasing the equity share.
Furthermore, Green Finance does not only consider the perspective of single 
investors but also of manufacturers - for example manufacturers of photovoltaic 
cells (Goodrich et al., 2013) and whole supply chains. In particular, the question 
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how to increase the sustainability of supply chains is receiving strong attention, 
especially from the field of operations research (see e.g. Linton et al., 2007;
Zhang and Liu, 2013). Good reviews on these research field are provided by 
Seuring and Müller (2008) and Brandenburg and Rebs (2015). The review of 
Dekker et al. (2012) specializes on the sub-problem of green logistics. A 
substantial part on the research on sustainable supply chains deals with the 
reduction of the supply-chain’s carbon footprint (see e.g. Du et al., 2011;
Abdallah et al., 2012; Chaabane et al., 2012; Elhedhli and Merrick, 2012;
Benjaafar et al., 2013; Dong et al., 2014; Lukas and Welling, 2014).
A total different research strand in the field of Green Finance that is closely linked 
to environmental economics focusses on the analysis of policies regarding the 
support of green technologies. For example, Kumbaroglu and Madlener (2003)
develop a method for the macroscopic analysis of a country’s energy and climate 
policy, Detert and Kotani (2013) set up a model that allows to determine when a 
country should change its policy from supporting conventional power to the 
support of renewable electricity and Helm (2014) discusses the whole European 
framework of energy and climate policies. More specifically, Galvin (2010)
discusses the German policy regarding the thermal insulation of residential real 
estate and Sorda et al. (2010) give an overview on the possibilities to support bio-
fuels.
Likewise, the governmental support of carbon emissions reduction is subject to 
much research. Here, with carbon taxation and cap-and-trade two different 
support systems are used by governments throughout the world. With respect to 
cap-and-trade a good review on the history, function and success of the European 
Union Emissions Trading System is given by Ellerman and Buchner (2007). For a 
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brief discussion on carbon taxation see e.g. Proost and Regemorter (1992), Zhang, 
Zhong Xiang and Baranzini (2004), and Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann (2009):
Further, many researchers analyze the governmental support of renewable 
electricity. An overview of the various systems and their advantages and 
disadvantages is given by Ackermann et al. (2001) and Haas et al. (2004).
Focusing on only one support system Kahn (1996) disapproves the concept of tax 
credits, Helm (2002) criticizes the system of renewable quotas and obligations 
trading, Duke et al. (2005) discuss the effect of net-metering (a producer of 
renewable electricity can feed excess electricity in the grid and later use the same 
amount for free) for private photovoltaic investments, Zipp (2015) analyzes the 
effect of fixed feed-in tariffs on the orientation of photovoltaic cells, and 
Mudasser et al. (2015) demonstrate the effect of location-dependent fixed feed-in 
tariffs. Gan et al. (2007) compares the policies of different countries. Likewise, 
Mitchell et al. (2006) compare fixed feed-in tariffs with renewable quotas, and 
Garcia-Bernabeu et al. (2015) compare fixed feed-in tariffs with a support system 
based on market prices.
A related research strand analyzes the effects of a sudden change in a 
governmental support scheme as well as the process of a careful adjustment of 
governmental support schemes. For example, Büsgen and Dürrschmidt (2009)
describe the evolution of the German feed-in tariff support scheme and 
Munksgaard and Morthorst (2008) show the effects of a sudden switch in the 
Danish support system of wind power. In this regard several authors discuss the 
reasons for political action and the manner of political decision-making (see e.g. 
van der Horst, 2007; Wüstenhagen et al., 2007; Hoppmann et al., 2014; Sühlsen 
and Hisschemöller, 2014). However, it may well be noted that political decision-
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making is far away from being deterministic. Lüthi and Wüstenhagen (2012)
argue that although under fixed feed-in tariff support schemes renewable 
electricity investments seem to be almost riskless investors should better take into 
account the political uncertainty regarding a possible regime switch. Indeed, 
Meijer et al. (2007) could empirically show that political uncertainties weaken the 
investment activity regarding renewables. Yang et al. (2008) and Boomsma et al. 
(2012) both set up a real option model to analyze optimal investment decisions in 
the context of renewable electricity investments under the presence of economic 
and political uncertainty. 
Likewise, in Welling et al. (2015) the potential investor of a green project faces 
economic as well as political uncertainty. The investment decision is modeled and 
analyzed by means of real options with the special feature that the political 
uncertainty totally resolves at the next election day. The article also sets lights on 
the different effect of political risk and political ambiguity (or Knightian 
uncertainty) on the investment decision. 
Finally, an important research strand in the field of Green Finance tries to 
determine the optimal policy of governments to support green investments. 
Therefore, at a first step, the reaction function of the investors has to be 
determined. In particular, to be able to optimize the policy it has to be known, 
how exactly the investment activity depends on the governmental support. Dinica 
(2006) argues that the risk/profitability characteristics induced by a support 
scheme determine the investment activity. Some researchers empirically analyze 
the reaction function of investors. For example, Barradale (2014) investigates the 
industries feelings  regarding political uncertainty and their expectations for future 
regulations and Linnerud et al. (2014) determine the reaction function of hydro 
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power investors. Interestingly, they could show that different classes of investors 
react differently. In particular, institutional investors act in accordance to real 
option theory, i.e. they wait with the investment if political uncertainty is high, 
while the reaction of private investors does not depend on uncertainty regarding a 
political regime shift. Zhang et al. (2013) have developed an equilibrium model 
that allows to determine the reaction of whole bio-fuel producing supply chains on 
certain governmental policies and Wickart and Madlener (2007) discuss the 
effects of carbon taxation on the investment activity. Boomsma et al. (2012) have 
set up a real option model that determines the reaction of investors, i.e. investment 
timing and investment capacity, in dependence of the different governmental 
support schemes.
Building on the model of Boomsma et al. (2012) Welling (2016b) analyzes the 
effect of an increase or decrease of a certain type of governmental support on the 
investment activity. Paradoxically, it can be shown that an increase of 
governmental support over time may weaken the investment activity.
Furthermore, to be able to optimize the governmental policy, as a second step, the 
objective has to be determined with regard to which the policy shall be optimal. 
For example, Schmidheiny (1992) developed the objective of eco-efficiency as 
“the ratio between the (added) value of what has been produced (e.g. GDP) and 
the (added) environment impacts of the product or service”. Additionally, a way 
has to be defined how the achievement of the objectives shall be measured. In this 
regard, Chen (2014) explains and compares two methods to measure eco-
efficiency, while Lee (2012) and Schaltegger and Csutora (2012) focus on carbon 
accounting, i.e. a way to measure carbon emissions of plants or supply chains.
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On one hand optimizing governmental support can mean to slightly adjust 
existing support schemes. For example, Langniß et al. (2009) propose three 
different ways to optimally develop the German support of renewable electricity 
and Kosugi (2013) analyzes how to optimally adjust fixed feed-in tariffs if 
investment cost decrease due to progress on the learning curve. On the other hand 
optimizing governmental support can mean to develop a new optimal system. 
Here, Pindyck (2002), and building on this paper Lin et al. (2007), develop a real 
option model to determine the optimal timing of governmental action, Stadler et 
al. (2007) develop a simulation tool that allows to determine how public money 
can be spent most efficiently to promote sustainable energy systems, Du et al. 
(2012) analyze the optimal cap in a cap-and-trade system for carbon, and 
Eckhause and Herold (2014) use stochastic dynamic programming to obtain
optimal funding solutions under uncertainty. Other researchers are working on 
methods that are adapted to problems in the field of green finance and allow to
model and solve optimization problems with multiple objectives (see e.g. 
Konidari and Mavrakis, 2007 ; Oliveira et al., 2014). For example, Blechinger and 
Shah (2011), use the multi-criteria of Konidari and Mavrakis (2007) to evaluate 
policy measures for climate change mitigation Trinidad and Tobago.
5. Conclusion
Green Finance is a very diverse research field that strongly application-orientated 
deals with many different - and often highly complex - problems. Although there 
already exists a rich literature on certain aspects, political and technological 
developments guarantee, that new problems arise unremittingly, that can be 
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analyzed, modeled, evaluated, and optimized. In the following, some of these 
emerging problem areas are presented. In particular, those, of which the author 
assumes, that they will be increasingly focused on by researchers in the future.
Firstly, after the successful diffusion of renewable electricity technologies 
governments around the world are faced with the task of adjusting their support
systems. A prime objective is to slowly adjust the remuneration for the production 
of renewable electricity to the actual economic value produced. In the first 
instance, the aim should not be an abrupt or a strong reduction in overall funding,
which could seriously damage whole industrial branches. Instead, the task will be 
to carefully link the enumeration of renewable electricity to market prices to take 
into account the place and the time of the production of renewable electricity.
Especially, under strict fixed feed-in tariff support schemes the time and place of 
production, so far, had no influence.
In this regard two other problem fields arise. On one hand, there is the task to find 
a way to reward the provision of reserve capacity in the form of fast-rising but 
expensive power plants; on the other hand storage technologies become more and 
more important. Open research questions are the choice of the best technology, 
the technical and economic interplay with renewable energies, the impact on the 
electricity market and on electricity prices, as well as the appropriate 
governmental support of storage technologies and their further technological 
development. Finally, smart grid technologies can be an alternative to support grid 
stability. Here, with the help of new data transmission technologies of machine-
to-machine communication the electricity consumption is intelligently controlled 
using market data, i.e. the demand takes the stochastic production quantity into 
account.
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Another major challenge in the research field of Green Finance lies in the current 
trend of increasing political uncertainties. International terrorism, financial crises,
the regression of democracies into autocracy, the increased presence of populist 
parties and persons, and the increasing skepticism towards international 
institutions and towards free trade, they all have the consequence that political 
decision-making is becoming more and more ambiguous; especially in case of
green technologies, where decisions are often made internationally. Hence, 
research should give special attention to negotiations on climate summits, to the 
prediction of election outcomes and their consequences for green investments, and 
to the analysis of international negotiations, such as the Brexit.
Finally, big tasks arise with the transition of fossil-fuel based mobility towards 
sustainable and alternative mobility. In particular, an increased use of electric cars 
will have major impacts on electricity grids, grid stability, and market prices for 
electricity. Consequently, this will also have an impact on investments in 
renewable energies, on investments in electricity storage and on investments in
energy efficiency
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